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1  INTRODUCTION 
Following the idea that university systems with competitive funding mechanisms provide 
output incentives and are consequently more efficient and more productive than traditional 
funding environments, university research in Europe is increasingly funded by a mix of 
‘fixed’ institutional budget and project-based funds (Auranen and Nieminen 2010). The latter 
can be raised from diverse sources. Public funding schemes from regional, national or supra-
national sources including governments as well as research foundations and to an increasing 
extent industrial grants and contracts provide such extramural funds.  
Besides this shift in the universities’ funding environments, technological change increasingly 
depends on academic research (Nelson 1986, von Hippel 1988, Jaffe 1989, Mansfield 1991, 
Acs et al. 1992). In particular the growth of “science-based technologies” such as 
biotechnology, information technologies, and sophisticated materials, strengthened the 
relevance of science for technological innovation. The role of universities has therefore been 
seen in facilitating the translation of basic science into applicable technology. The extent to 
which a university contributes to innovation in a particular industry depends (at least in part) 
on the industrial support for research at that university (Mansfield 1995). Although industry 
funding accounts only for a relatively small share of the overall research expenditures in most 
OECD countries, it still receives considerable attention. The possibility for researchers to 
raise funds from private sector firms may open-up new opportunities for researchers and such 
funds may constitute a basis on which science and industry interact and thereby create social 
and economic returns (Mansfield 1995, Hall et al. 2003).  
While previous literature found academic research to be highly valuable for industrial 
innovation (Mansfield 1998; Narin et al. 1997; Zucker et al. 2002; Hall et al. 2001a; Cassiman 
et al 2008), the criteria and qualities according to which firms approach academics has not 
been studied as extensively. Do firms benefit from sourcing basic science that is not feasible 
or unprofitable to built-up themselves? Or do they seek access to rather applied research that 
provides knowledge that is closer to applicable technology and thus closer to marketable 
innovations? The main underlying question is thus whether firms substitute or complement 
their own R&D with university research. Another question that arises is whether research 
orientation plays a different role for the successful acquisition of public grants as compared to 
industry funds. The rationale behind public research funding has traditionally been based on 
the positive externalities from basic science. Public funding for applied research, on the other 
hand, usually has been linked to public-private research partnerships and has been justified by  
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the resulting wider economic benefits from such collaboration. Given the limits of public 
funds, award criteria generally revolve around academic excellence (Viner et al. 2004, 
Sorensen and Fleming 2004) which, in turn, is reflected in the research focus of awardees. 
Excellence may require a high degree of specialization which facilitates the creation of an 
accumulative advantage.  
This article adds to previous research by studying the role of research orientation, i.e. basic 
versus applied research, for attracting competitive research funding from the private as well as 
from the public sector. The sample of 678 research units at 48 higher education institutions in 
Germany covers a broad range of disciplines from science and engineering. The results 
suggest that basic and applied research is complementary for raising funds from industry. 
Professors whose labs conduct both types of research attract most funding from industry in 
contrast to those who are focused on either basic or applied research, both in monetary terms 
as well as in percent of their total research budget. For raising grants from public sources, on 
the other hand, specialization seems more important. Specialized research units on either 
basic or applied research obtain significantly more public grants pointing to a substitutive 
relationship between basic and applied research for such grants.  
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of insights from previous 
research; section 3 describes the data and sets out the empirical framework. Section 4 presents 
the results. Section 5 briefly discusses some robustness checks before section 6 concludes and 
points out roads for further research.   
 
2  BASIC RESEARCH, APPLIED RESEARCH, OR BEST BOTH?  
While research activities were traditionally funded by the institutions’ core funding, more 
recently additional grants make up an ever larger share of universities research budgets 
(Schmoch and Schubert 2009, Auranen and Nieminen 2010).  Besides the growing role of 
funding from the private business sector, public research funding is also becoming 
increasingly competitive. The rules and precepts according to which such funds are granted 
may naturally differ between schemes and sponsors.  
Most research in the field of industry-science linkages takes the viewpoint of the firm. That is 
which firms collaborate with universities, and what benefits emerge for these firms 
(Gambardella 1992, Cassiman et al. 2008, 2010). Acquisition of scientific research has been 
shown to be beneficial for firms in many respects ranging from increased productivity of their  
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own R&D efforts (Cockburn and Henderson 1998), to a reduction in labor cost (Stern 2004). 
It had also been argued that science provides information to industry about promising future 
technology development and thereby avoiding or reducing firms’ “search costs” for ideas 
(Dasgupta and David 1994, Hall et al. 2003, Crespi et al. 2007). Thus, sourcing technological 
knowledge from universities moreover reduces firms’ risk of expanding in new fields of 
technology (e.g. Mowery 1998; Zucker and Darby 1996; Zucker et al. 2002). Financing 
university research may constitute a channel through which industry seeks access to science 
directly and more specifically compared to scientific information that is open to the general 
public. As studies for instance by Zucker and Darby (1996) and Cockburn and Henderson 
(1998) have shown, industry scientists increasingly conduct research and publish results 
jointly with university researchers. These activities may be the outcome of sponsored 
research. Less evidence can be found on the characteristics of university researchers, 
departments and universities who are most successful in raising research funding from 
industry. The reason for this lack of attention in the literature so far could be found in the 
seemingly obviousness of the question who attracts industry funding. As argued by 
Trajtenberg et al. (1997) industry R&D is directed at commercial success while university 
research focuses on solving fundamental science questions. Scientific research moreover 
relies on an in-debt discussion of previous research and involves careful documentation of 
trial and error in the research process. Industry research on the other hand is rather focused on 
exploitation of existing technologies and is not subject to rules of scientific research conduct 
(Fleming and Sorensen 2004).  
This notion implies that universities represent a medium producing basic scientific knowledge 
that serves as basis for industrial innovation. Thus, it seems obvious to assume that firms fund 
university research to gain access to such basic research. that complements their own 
application-oriented R&D. This is supported by Czarnitzki et al. (2009) who study the 
basicness of patents of German professors and find that these academic patents are opposed 
less frequently than a control group of corporate patents. They argue that this suggests that 
academic patents cover rather basic inventions with low immediate commercial value. For 
academic patents in collaboration with the business sector that may also be the outcome of 
sponsored research the effect turns out to be weaker, which suggests that those patents are 
evaluated as more applied by owners of potentially rival technologies. Jensen et al.’s (2010) 
results also suggest that university research projects are more basic than firm projects and that 
there are spillovers from university research to firms. Sourcing knowledge from universities  
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directly via grants and contracts may thus be particular relevant for firms whose R&D 
employees lack specific skills or resources to conduct basic research in-house or firms that 
want to reduce the risk and costs related to it. Veugelers and Cassiman (2005) find for their 
sample of firms located in Belgium that firms impeded by costs to innovate are more likely to 
cooperate with universities, hinting to a substitutive relationship between firm-level and 
university research.  
However, firms cannot absorb scientific knowledge without efforts. Cockburn et al. (1999) 
study incentives for basic and applied research in the pharmaceutical industry that - in the late 
1970s - was subject to significant changes in research directed at drug discovery. In particular, 
advances in university research in the fields of biochemistry and molecular biology resulted in 
“a new technology for drug discovery” in which success in applied research depended on the 
researchers’ prior experience in related basic research (see also Toole 2007). Their study 
exemplifies how firms can react to the increasing importance of science-based technologies 
and hence the increasing relevance of university-generated knowledge for industry. Firms can 
either adapt in-house incentives for basic research or they can increase collaboration with 
university scientists directly such as by sponsoring research projects conducted within 
universities. In both cases investments in absorptive capacity may be crucial. The extent of 
such investment, however, may depend on whether they source solely basic research or 
whether they are able to contract researchers who have a less specialized research focus, i.e. 
that comprise both basic and applied research skills.  
Thursby and Thursby (2004) suggest that absorptive capacity is moreover necessary for firms 
to monitor research efforts within sponsored research agreements. Consequently, it could be 
argued that applied science is easier to identify and to exploit for industry and involves lower 
monitoring costs. Hence, instead of sourcing pure basic research results firms could target 
university research that is more applied and consequently less costly to adopt. In other words, 
industry could be more willing to seek access to (technological) knowledge that is less basic, 
has passed a certain threshold of applicability, and is thus closer to industry demands.  
The role of research orientation for attracting third-party funding may thus not only be a 
crucial one, but also one that had been studied less thoroughly than for instance the effects of 
such grants on academic productivity (Jacob and Lefgren 2007, Hottenrott and Thorwarth 
2010). One notable exception is an exploratory study by Gulbransen and Smeby (2005). 
Based on the claim that increased industrial funding will force universities into taking on ever 
more applied research (Geuna 2001; Geuna and Nesta 2006), they study differences in  
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research orientation between university professors with industrial funding and professors with 
other types of funding or no external research funding. They find support in their Norwegian 
data for the hypothesis that professors with industrial funding indeed describe their research 
more often as applied than professors without industrial funding. Whether professors with an 
ex-ante applied research orientation are more likely to receive (more) funds from industry 
than others is beyond the scope of their analysis.  
Previous studies did, however, shed some light on the question which fields of science 
particular industries were interested in and on the importance of geographical proximity for 
getting funded by industry as well as on faculty quality (Mansfield 1995, Mansfield and Lee 
1996). At the university-level Ljungberg (2008) finds mainly larger and highly specialized 
universities in Sweden attract most industry funding relative to their size. The larger but less 
specialized universities and most of the smaller regional colleges and universities receive less. 
Thus, he sees specialization in research as important characteristic for explaining differences 
in the ability to attract firm funding. Broström (2011) finds in a study on firms collaborating 
with major Swedish universities that these firms work with university researchers in order to 
access academic networks and to strengthen skills of their employees, i.e. increasing 
absorptive capacity for knowledge spillovers in general, not only from science. This may 
suggest that firms are less interested in highly specialized research unit, but in those that 
provide a variety of skills.  
Thursby and Thursby (2002) study businesses that license-in university technologies and find 
that such technologies are mostly early stage technologies, i.e. require further research on 
their application. They also show that if inventions are ‘too embryonic to license’, firms use 
the channel of sponsoring research to pursue the invention. They measure the firms’ 
absorptive capacity by the portion of the firm’s basic research share and argue that if 
university research is a substitute for firm R&D, firms with higher absorptive capacity rely 
less on university research. Their results support the hypothesis that university and industry 
basic research are complementary and that firms also value applied university research in the 
development phase of a licensed university invention. These results are confirmed in a later 
study by Thursby et al. (2007) suggesting that the majority of inventions licensed are so 
‘embryonic’ that for commercialization to be successful, faculty participation in further 
development is crucial. This implies that both basic research as well as research on the 
applicability of the results may be an important criterion for firms to direct their research 
sponsoring. Moreover, the possibility to attract research grants from industry may create  
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incentives for researchers that usually have a taste for rather basic research to also focus their 
work on commercial development (Levin and Stephan 1991, Jensen and Thursby 2001, 
Jensen et al. 2003).  
With respect to research orientation public grants may be granted on different means as 
compared to private sector funds. In many countries the share of direct, fixed public research 
funding has stagnated or even decreased over the past decades (Geuna and Nesta 2006), while 
the share of public funding that is being allocated based on “mission-oriented” or “contract-
based strategic allocation procedures” has been rising (Viner et al. 2004, Auranen and 
Nieminen 2010). Regardless of the forms of funds’ allocation, public funding constitutes the 
predominant source of funding for university research (OECD 2007, 2009, Bozeman and 
Gaughan 2007). Public research funding, in particular basic research, is usually justified on 
the grounds of the high social value it creates. There is indeed extensive evidence that basic 
research does also lead to considerable economic benefits (see Salter and Martin 2001 for a 
review). Thus, one would expect basic research to attract the majority of public grants.  
However, as policies and funding programs have been initiated that particularly aim at 
fostering EU countries’ economic strength in converting top-level scientific research output 
into marketable innovations, an increased attention of public funding authorities also on 
applied research could be expected. Besides a number of non-funding-related policies like 
Bayh-Dole Act type of legislations and the abolishment of the so-called professor privilege in 
several European countries among which Germany, Denmark and Austria that exempted 
university professors from the obligation to transfer intellectual property rights of their 
publicly funded inventions to their home institution (Von Ledebur et al. 2009), a trend in 
promoting industry-science collaboration can be observed. In Germany “direct project 
funding” by the Federal Government, for instance, has been to an increasing extent directed at 
promoting industry-science consortia, while grants given to pure firm research consortia or 
pure science consortia did not grow at comparable rates (Czarnitzki et al. 2008). Results from 
an interview-based study by Broström (2011) even suggest public co-funding of collaborative 
research between university and industry should be awarded on the merits of application-
oriented problem solving rather than fundamental research alone as it increases incentives in 
the business sector to participate in such programs. This claim, however, stands in stark 
contrast the rationale behind public funding of R&D that is usually based on the assertion that 
basic research is associated with positive spillover effects to the entire economy (see Feldman  
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and Kelley 2006 for an overview). In the same line of reasoning, public funding of applied 
projects might be considered as inefficient and thus as undesired (Mowery 1998). 
In any case, given the constraints in the availability of public funds, award criteria generally 
revolve around academic excellence (Viner et al. 2004, Sorensen and Fleming 2004). The 
evaluation of scientific excellence is mostly based on peer-review reports (Jacobs and Lefgren 
2007). The strong focus on excellence may also be reflected in the research focus of 
awardees. Excellence may require a high degree of specialization which facilitates the 
creation of an accumulative advantage at the level of the individual researcher or the research 
team. 
This study aims to contribute to the understanding of how university research matches 
industry demands for scientific knowledge by analyzing the role of research orientation for 
the attraction of competitive research funding. Given the previous discussion, we expect this 
role to differ between public and private sector sources. On the one hand firms may fund 
basic university research that complements their in-house applied research or to increase basic 
research skills of their own researchers. On the other, firms may source applied university 
research as they can absorb such knowledge input at lower cost and it reduces the ‘distance’ 
from basic science to applicable technology that may be especially large for early-stage 
technologies. As both arguments are straight forward, one could reason that firms prefer those 
researchers as collaboration partners - and hence as sponsoring targets - whose labs are 
capable of doing both basic as well as applied research. If that applies empirically, we would 
expect to find a complementary relationship between basic and applied research orientation. 
Unlike for industry grants, the complementary argument is less suitable for public grants. 
Funding authorities do not face a trade-off between the benefits from accessing basic research 
and the costs of building absorptive capacities to fruitfully use such knowledge inputs. For 
public grants the most important objective should be to derive the highest returns to society 
from the amount spent. Thus, experts conducting ground-breaking basic research on the one 
hand, but also applied researchers who contribute with their work to the translation of science 
into day-to-day applicable technology, on the other, may be the desired targets.  
Besides the effects of researchers’ research focus, their academic achievements in terms of 
scientific publications as well as invention disclosures in the form of patent applications are – 
in addition to lab and institution characteristics – taken into account for their willingness or 
ability to attract research grants from either source.   
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3  DATA AND EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK  
The data for the following analysis had been collected from different data sources. First, a 
survey among research units at German higher education institutions (stratified by regions) in 
the fields of science or engineering has been conducted in 2000 by the Centre for European 
Economic Research (ZEW, Mannheim). The survey addressed “heads of research units” at 
different types of institutes: universities, technical universities and polytechnic colleges. Thus, 
the unit of analysis is the research lab. In the German system of higher education this 
typically means that one full professor heads a research unit with scientific assistants (pre- 
and post-doctorates) as well as non-scientific technical and administrative staff. The range of 
public research institutions in Germany comprises institutions that are committed to different 
fields of research (general universities vs. polytechnics and technical universities) and also to 
different technology transfer channels. The publicly funded R&D infrastructure in Germany 
also includes non-university research (Beise and Stahl 1999). The original survey also 
addressed such public non-profit research institutions such as Fraunhofer or Max-Planck 
institutes. We excluded these responses from our analysis as these public non-profit research 
institutions differ substantially from research units at universities and polytechnics, for 
instance with respect to the fact that there is no teaching, no graduate education and the 
organizational structure is different from the three types of universities.
1 This study thus 
focuses on scientists at general and technical universities as swell as at polytechnics who are 
also occupied with teaching. After the elimination of incomplete records the final sample 
contains 669 professor-research unit observations from 46 different institutions of which 56% 
are universities, 23% are technical universities and 21% are polytechnics.   
The main variables of interest are obtained directly from the survey. Professors indicated the 
percentage of their units’ research that is directed at basic research (BASIC_SHARE) or applied 
research (APPLIED_SHARE). The original survey data distinguished applied research and 
experimental development. For the purpose of this study, the latter category had been added 
to the applied research share. As BASIC_SHARE and APPLIED_SHARE add up to 1, it is necessary 
to multiply the individual shares are with the number of scientific staff (mean = 13, median = 
9 and the maximum number is 130). This transformation results in a slight shift in 
interpretation of the variable from ‘share of effort devoted to basic or applied research’ to 
                                                 
1 See Czarnitzki and Rammer (2003) for more details on the institutional structures of higher education in 
Germany.  
  9
‘staff working on basic or applied research’. Thus, it ought to be kept in mind for the 
interpretation of the results that these variables (BASIC and APPLIED) also measure lab size.  
Moreover, the amount of private-sector research grants, i.e. money from industrial firms 
received during 1999 both in monetary terms (INDFUND) as well as share of their overall 
budget (INDSHARE) and the corresponding information on public grants (GOVFUND, 
GOVSHARE) is obtained immediately from the survey. The sum of INDFUND and GOVFUND is 
‘total third-party funding’. Adding this to the ‘core’ institutional funding (COREFUND) yields 
the units’ overall funding: TOTALFUND =  INDFUND + GOVFUND + COREFUND. 
General universities were traditionally known for teaching and basic research without directly 
aiming at commercialization of their research results. The main transfer channel thus is the 
publication of research results. The share of research grants from industry is thus lower 
compared to technical universities or polytechnics. However, the shares of public grants of 
total budgets are, on average, larger than for the other types of institutions (see Table A.2). In 
contrast, technical universities and polytechnics have a tradition of industry-related research. 
According to Beise and Stahl (1999) polytechnics are often specialized in the same technical 
fields as local businesses and are supposed to support small- and medium-sized firms through 
consultancy and the supply of graduates. Polytechnics usually focus on education, but do also 
conduct research that has a reputation for being “down-to-earth”.  
To control for other important determinants of research grants besides research orientation for 
both types of sources, a number of additional variables are included in the analysis. Most 
importantly, the previous scientific performance of the research unit’s heads may also impact 
the attraction of grants (e.g. Murray 2002, Viner et al. 2004, Grimpe and Fier 2009). Thus, the 
survey data has been supplemented with publication and patent information. Past scientific 
publications of the professors have been collected from the ISI Web of Science
® database 
using the ISI Web of Knowledge
® platform. This information includes publications (articles, 
notes, reviews and letters) of professors in our sample (PUBS) as well as the number of 
citations these publications received (CIT_PUBS). We searched for publications by the 
professors’ names and subsequently filtered results on the basis of affiliations, addresses and 
journal fields. Information on patent applications (PATS) on which the respective professor 
occurred as inventor is drawn from the data base of the German Patent and Trademark Office 
(DPMA). We searched for the professors’ names in the inventor information in the patent file. 
To assess the quality or impact of the patents forward citations to these patents are collected 
as well (CIT_PATS). Patent forward citations have been shown to be a suitable measure for the  
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quality, importance or significance of a patented invention and have been used in various 
studies (see e.g. Henderson et al. 1998; Hall et al. 2001b; Trajtenberg 2001 or Czarnitzki et al. 
2008). As a third performance measure, the average number of citations per publication 
(patent) is calculated (CIT_per_PUB, CIT_per_PAT). For our main analysis we limit the time 
horizon (“activity window”) for publications, counts of patents, and citations to both, to the 
period from 1994 to 1999.  
As the effectiveness with which a research unit attracts third-party funding may among other 
factors depend on the head’s experience or seniority, information from the German National 
Library on the year in which the professor received his PhD was gathered.
2 From this 
information the years of the professors’ experience (EXPER) in academe was calculated. To 
test for any non-linear life-cycle effect (Levin and Stephan 1991), the squared value (EXPER
2) 
is included as well. Although all professors in the sample are rather senior academic staff 
represented in the fact that they are heading a research unit, it may still be adequate to control 
for differences in seniority.  
For differences in the size of the different institutions is controlled by including the (logged) 
total number of students ln(UNI_SIZE). Larger universities may, for instance, be more visible to 
funding agencies and to industry and thus attract relatively more third-party funding. A 
squared term is included to control for non-linearity in UNI_SIZE. Moreover, it is known from 
the survey whether the professor had contact to his institution’s Technology Transfer Office 
(TTO). As it is conceivable that such contacts impact both stronger technology transfer 
awareness and the likelihood of establishing contracts with industry, it may also affect 
industry funding. We control for differences between research fields by including seven field 
dummies (see Table A.2 for key variables by research field). Three institution type dummies 
are added to capture differences in funding patterns due to the type of institution (university, 
technical university and polytechnic). Finally, we include a gender dummy (FEMALE). Table 1 
shows descriptive statistics of the main variables of interest.  
Research units in the sample obtained about 96.5 thousand Euros from industry on average. 
This makes up for 8.6% of the total budget in 1999. Grants from public sources amounted to 
                                                 
2 In Germany a dissertation needs to be published in the German National Library (Deutsche 
Nationalbibliothek). This central archival library among other things, collects, permanently archives, 
comprehensively documents and records bibliographically all German and German-language publications from 
1913 onwards. For professors who according to their CVs either obtained their doctoral degree abroad or do not 
have a PhD, we used the year of their first publication as a proxy for the beginning of their academic career. If 
professors had very common surnames like “Müller” or “Fischer” and also common first names, we preferred to 
drop these from our data since publication and/or patent data could not be uniquely identified for them.  
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about 120 thousand Euros on average or about 22% of their total budget. Research units spend 
on average 42% of their time on basic research. The share is higher at universities (57%) and 
considerably lower at Polytechnics (4%). At technical universities the average share of 
applied research is 62%. The relative focus on applied research naturally differs between 
fields of research. Electrical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering and other Engineering 
report high shares of 79%, 77% and 74%, respectively.  Research units in Chemistry and 
Physics spend about 61% and 69% of their time of basic research, while and Mathematicians 
and Computer Scientists and Biologists have basic research shares of 56% and 50%, 
respectively. Professors in the sample published on average eleven items in the period 1994-
1999 and occurred 1.4 times as inventor on a patent application. The numbers vary by 
research field and type of institution (see Table A.2). The size of the institutions differs in 
student numbers ranging from 1,451 to nearly 60 thousand students. The share of scientists of 
a unit’s total staff is 73% on average. The share is slightly lower at polytechnics (68%) and 
technical universities (71%). The professors have an average experience of about 22 years in 
academe. 73% of them had some form of contact to a TTO and only 3% of them are female.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (699 obs.) 
Variable Description  Mean  Std.  Dev  Min  Max 
Grant-based funding 
INDFUNDt  T €  96.43  219.90  0  2,129.53 
INDSHAREt  % of total budget   8.61  13.48  0  100 
GOVFUNDt  T €  118.31  244.44  0  1,844.53 
GOVSHAREt  % of total budget   21.71  20.22  0  100 
Research orientation        
BASIC_SHARE  %/100 0.42  0.34  0  1 
APPLIED_SHARE  %/100 0.58  0.34  0  1 
Controls        
PUBSt-6 to t  publication count  11.08  20.51  0  243 
PUBCITSt-6 to t  citation count  228.16  571.22  0  5,907 
PATSt-6 to t  patent count  1.41  3.48  0  32 
PATCITSt-6 to t  citation count  20.25  126.61  0  2,634 
UNI_SIZE  student count  17,789.40  11,817.00  1,451  59,599 
SCI_STAFF  % if total staff  73.24  17.13  6.66  100 
EXPER  years since PhD  21.64  8.68  1  43 
TTO  dummy 0.73  0.44  0 1 
FEMALE  dummy 0.03  0.18  0 1 
Note: Pair-wise correlations between the variables are presented in Table A.1. Institution-type dummies and field dummies not presented 
(see Table A.2 in the Appendix). Note also that the time period for the controls for past scientific includes t as articles published in t have 
usually been written in the years up to t, thus reflecting research outcomes of the period t-1 or earlier. The same applies to patents applied 
for in t.  
 
4  ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
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The research unit’s amount of industry funding (INDFUND, and the share of this funding as % 
of total budget INDSHARE) as well the amount and share of public grants (GOVFUND, 
GOVSHARE) are the dependent variables of interest in the following econometric analysis. Not 
all professors in the sample attracted third-party funds, however. More than 1/3 of the 
professors had no funding from the private sector, that is, INDFUND is left censored. 22% of 
the observations for GOVFUND are also censored. In 13% of these cases the research unit was 
financed by core budget only. Hence, Tobit models are being estimated to account for this 
bias. The models to be estimated can be written as 
(1)                                 
* ' YX    , 
where the unobserved latent variable Y* is equal to INDSHARE and GOVSHARE in the first set of 
models and to the logarithm of INDFUND* and GOVFUND* (+1), respectively, in the second set 
of specifications. The observed dependent variable is equal to 
(2)                           
* if ' 0
0o t h e r w i s e
YX
Y




X represents the matrix of regressors, β the parameters to be estimated, and  the random error 
term.  
 
The impact of research orientation on acquisition of research grants 
The main hypothesis concerns the effects of a unit’s research orientation (BASIC or APPLIED) 
on third-party funding. Remember that in order to avoid collinearity between the regressors 
BASIC_SHARE and APPLIED_SHARE  (as they add up to 1),  the individual shares had been 
multiplied with the number of scientific staff. This transformation led to a slight shift in 
interpretation of the variable from ‘share of effort devoted to basic or applied research’ to 
‘staff working on basic or applied research’. To test for complementarity between the two, an 
interaction term BASIC*APPLIED is added to the model. The main equation of interest can thus 
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where FIELDk refer to the seven research areas and INSTYPEs refers to the three different type of 
institutions (UNI, TU, POLYTECH).  
Subsequent to this core specification, we will add the research track record of unit’s heads 
(PUBS and PATS), information on the lab’s skill composition (TECHS, POSTDOCS, PROFS) and 
gender (FEMALE). Due to the skewed distributions of patents and publications, the logs of 
these variables are included. For those with zero patents or publications, i.e. if the log is not 
defined, a dummy variable is included to capture the “quasi-missing” value (NO_PUB_DUM, 
NO_PAT_DUM). 
The standard Tobit model requires the assumption of homoscedasticity; otherwise the 
estimates are inconsistent (cf. Greene, 2000). Tests on heteroscedasticity (Wald tests and LR 
Tests) using a heteroscedastic specification of the Tobit model in which the homoscedastic 
standard error  was replaced with i =  exp(Z’) in the likelihood function find indeed 
evidence of heteroscedasticity. Consequently, regional dummies, one for each of the 16 
German states, field and institution type dummies were used to model group-wise 
multiplicative heteroscedasticity. The presented estimation results are thus obtained from 
heteroscedastic-consistent estimations. 
Table 2 presents the regression results of six specifications: The first is the core specification 
without the interaction term BASIC*APPLIED, the second model introduces this interaction 
term. Column three presents the results from the extended model including additional controls 
for past research output and gender. Columns four to six present the results of the Tobit 
models on GOVSHARE instead of INDSHARE.   
The results show that basic research reduces the share of funding from industry, whereas 
applied research has a significantly positive effect in all three specifications. The inclusion of 
the interaction term reveals that research units that do both basic as well as applied research 
have a larger share of industry grants compared to more specialized units. On the contrary, the 
models on GOVSHARE  show a negative sign for the interaction term which indicates a 
substitutive relationship between basic and applied research for the attraction of public grants. 
That is, higher values for both APPLIED and BASIC individually increases GOVSHARE. In other 
words, specialized research units show a higher share of each type of competitive research 
funding. The control variables show the expected effects. Having contact to a TTO increases 
industry funding, but has no effect on public grants. The share of industry grants is higher at 
larger institutions up to a size of about 14,000 students, but is decreasing with the number of  
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students at larger institutions. Moreover, having no past patent experience reduces the share 
of industry grants. The coefficient of the variable capturing past publications has the expected 
positive sign for public grants pointing to the importance of scientific achievements for 
raising such funds. Past patent application were not found to be significant for the share or 
amount of public grants.  
Turning to the results on the total amount of grants (GOVFUND) instead of the share of total 
budget, the key insights are confirmed. However, most control variables are now insignificant 
(Table 3). The estimated coefficients describe the marginal effects of the regressors on the 
investment propensity Y*, such that  








   

. 
(see e.g. Greene, 2000: 908-910). Since the dependent variable in this model is specified in 
logarithms, a unit change in our main variables of interest, i.e. BASIC and APPLIED, can be 
interpreted as a percentage change in funding. Recall that a unit change in BASIC or APPLIED 
means that an additional person works in the lab on applied or basic research. For instance in 
the third specification of Table 3, if APPLIED changes by one unit, industry funding (in terms 
of the latent index Y
*) increases by 8.1% and public grants by 10.8%. If BASIC changes by one 
unit, government grants (column 6) increase by about 10%, all else constant.  
The marginal effect could alternatively be computed based on Y instead of Y
* as 










        
. 
In this case, INDFUND increases by 7.4% if APPLIED changes by one unit, on average. Public 
grants would increase by 6.7% in response to an additional person working on basic research, 
and by 7.2% for an additional applied researcher.  
To graphically illustrate the complementary relationship between basic and applied research 
for attracting funds from industry, Figure 1 depicts the expected values for the amount of 
industry funding for different values of BASIC and APPLIED, respectively. Graph 1(a) shows 
that INDFUND decreases as BASIC increases, but that the decrease occurs at a lower rate and at 
a higher level for larger values of APPLIED  (at 0, 25
th, 50
th and 75
th percentiles of the 
distribution of APPLIED). Correspondingly, E(INDFUND) is not only higher for higher values of 
BASIC, but also increases at higher rates (Graph 1b).  
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The substitutive relationship of basic and applied research is illustrated in Graphs 2 (a) and 
(b). The expected value of public grants increases with the share of workforce dedicated to 
either basic (a) or applied (b) research. The increase, however, occurs at higher rates for lower 
levels of the opposed research focus up from a point in which this focus gets stronger than the 
other.   
Table 2: Tobit regressions on source of funding as share of total budget (669 obs.) 
Variable           Tobit Models on INDSHARE      Tobit Models on GOVSHARE 
BASIC  -0.153 *    -0.323**     -0.320**      0.252**   0.538***     0.454***
  (0.085)      (0.132)      (0.137)      (0.120)     (0.169)      (0.173)    
APPLIED  0.321 ***  0.229**      0.196***    0.344*** 0.516***     0.519***
  (0.082)      (0.090)      (0.085)      (0.125)     (0.160)      (0.172)    
BASIC*APPLIED        0.013**      0.013**        -0.019***    -0.017***
        (0.006)      (0.006)          (0.006)      (0.006)    
EXPER   0.275      0.296        0.287        0.854*    0.783        0.835    
  (0.333)      (0.340)      (0.305)      (0.512)     (0.512)      (0.521)    
EXPER
2  -0.010      -0.010       -0.009       -0.018     -0.017       -0.017    
  (0.007)      (0.008)      (0.007)      (0.012)     (0.012)      (0.012)    
TTO  3.927 ***  4.136***    3.404**      3.032     2.689        2.461    
  (1.516)      (1.542)      (1.498)      (2.022)     (2.032)      (2.055)    
ln(UNI_SIZE)  93.573 ***  91.531***   88.936***   16.759     24.552       22.597    
  (31.572)      (31.084)     (31.477)     (35.785)     (37.710)     (37.579)    
ln(UNI_SIZE
2)  -4.903 ***  -4.771***   -4.612***   -0.686     -1.139       -1.007    
  (1.653)      (1.627)      (1.649)  (1.879)     (1.975)      (1.970)    
ln(PUBS)     -0.729           1.928**  
    (0.712)         (0.924)    
ln(PATS)      0.914       1.862    
    (1.120)     (1.676) 
NO_PUB_DUM     -1.538      -0.281 
    (1.884)     (2.863) 
NO_PAT_DUM     -3.450**       2.997 
    (1.721)         (2.307)    
FEMALE      0.076           2.209    
    (2.189)         (4.838)    
Joint significance of 
institution dummies χ2 (2)
29.66*** 26.89***  21.60***  25.97*** 26.41***  24.96*** 
Joint  significance field 
dummies χ2 (6) 
42.16*** 41.27***  31.68***  32.09*** 33.15***  30.35*** 
Joint  significance Länder  
dummies χ2 (15) 
88.38*** 84.37***  99.21***  51.94*** 48.85**  51.83*** 
Log-Likelihood -1,855.67  -1,853.78  -1,851.48  -2,410.06  -2,406.32  -2,402.02 
# censored obs.  260 147 
Notes: All models include a constant, institution type and field dummies. The heteroscedasticity term includes six field dummies, 15 Länder 
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Table 3: Tobit regressions on source of funding (669 obs.) 
Notes: All models include a constant, institution type and field dummies. The heteroscedasticity term includes six field dummies, 15 Länder 
dummies and two institution type dummies. *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
 
5  ROBUSTNESS TESTS  
As a robustness check, all models have been estimated accounting for quality weighted 
measures of past research performance. The results confirm previous findings for the main 
variables of interest. The total number of citations to past publications (in the pre sample 
period 1994-1999) is positive and significant in the GOVFUND equation, but insignificant in 
for INDFUND. The same is true for citations per publication. It is noteworthy that the marginal 
effects are larger for the quality-weighted measures for scientific output (compare Tables 2 
and 4). Thus, the quality of scientific output seems not only to be important, but also to be 
Variable              Tobit Models on ln(INDFUND +1)       Tobit Models on ln(GOVFUND +1) 
BASIC  0.007       -0.025      -0.027     0.063*** 0.105***    0.098***
  (0.015)      (0.027)     (0.027)     (0.013)     (0.016)     (0.015)    
APPLIED  0.101 ***    0.086***   0.081***  0.083*** 0.107***    0.108***
  (0.018)      (0.020)     (0.020)     (0.009)     (0.013)     (0.013)    
BASIC*APPLIED          0.002*      0.002**        -0.003***   -0.002***
        (0.001)     (0.001)          (0.001)     (0.001)    
EXPER   0.036        0.042       0.041     0.080*    0.063       0.074    
  (0.070)      (0.072)     (0.071)     (0.046)     (0.044)     (0.045)    
EXPER
2  -0.001       -0.001      -0.001     -0.002     -0.001      -0.001    
  (0.002)      (0.002)     (0.002)     (0.001)     (0.001)     (0.001)    
TTO  1.134 ***    1.174***   1.016***  0.545*** 0.468***    0.457***
  (0.312)      (0.317)     (0.323)     (0.175)     (0.169)     (0.170)    
ln(UNI_SIZE)  7.347        6.639       5.575     1.714     2.816       2.170    
  (5.289)      (5.256)     (5.246)     (3.454)     (3.597)     (3.672)    
ln(UNI_SIZE
2)  -0.367       -0.325      -0.264     -0.067     -0.129      -0.094    
  (0.279)      (0.278)     (0.278)     (0.180)     (0.187)     (0.191)    
ln(PUBS)     -0.058       0.248*    
    (0.131)     (0.133)    
ln(PATS)      0.126       0.096    
    (0.202)  (0.075) 
NO_PUB_DUM     -0.310   -0.302 
    (0.379)  (0.256) 
NO_PAT_DUM     -0.692**    0.327 
    (0.311)     (0.211)    
FEMALE      0.141       0.164    
    (0.672) (0.512)    
Joint significance of 
institution dummies χ
2 (2) 
17.17*** 17.19***  15.52***  36.18*** 75.89***  79.39*** 
Joint  significance field 
dummies χ
2 (6) 
59.18*** 53.72***  43.59***  75.50*** 38.06***  36.13*** 
Joint  significance Länder  
dummies χ
2 (15) 
52.41*** 50.34**  48.61**  71.77*** 77.21***  74.19*** 
Log-Likelihood  -1,184.01 -1,182.23  -1,179.05  -1,162.25 -1,152.80  -1,147.28 
# censored obs.  260  147  
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more important for public grants than for industry grants. As before, professors without 
patents receive a significantly lower share of their funding from industry. All other measures 
for scientific excellence even if weighted by citations, however, appear not to affect the share 
of industry funding as long as we control for research orientation.  
As a second check we ran all models with the BASIC and APPLIED shares being multiplied 
with the total number of staff instead of scientific staff. The results remain robust to this 
variation. 
Table 4: Tobit regressions on source of funding (INDSHARE , GOVSHARE) with quality-
weighted publications and patents (669 obs) 
Variable  INDSHARE  
with citations  





with citations  




BASIC  -0.315**     -0.315**    0.509***     0.437*** 
  (0.135)   (0.137)     (0.152)      (0.160)    
APPLIED  0.224***     0.220***   0.515***     0.518*** 
  (0.083)   (0.085)     (0.160)      (0.170)    
BASIC*APPLIED  0.012*     0.012**    -0.019***    -0.017*** 
  (0.006)   (0.006)     (0.006)      (0.006)    
EXPER   0.139     0.145      0.830        0.871*   
  (0.335)   (0.344)     (0.513)      (0.521)    
EXPER
2  -0.006    -0.006      -0.017       -0.018    
  (0.007)   (0.008)     (0.012)      (0.012)    
TTO  3.694**     3.744**    2.627        2.767    
  (1.532)   (1.534)     (2.088)      (2.089)    
ln(UNI_SIZE)  91.173***    92.554***  33.351       28.714    
  (31.11)  (31.213)     38.018)     (37.765)    
ln(UNI_SIZE
2)  -4.742***    -4.812***   -1.603       -1.336    
  (1.629)   (1.634)     (1.988)      (1.978)    
CIT_PUB       0.012             2.053*** 
     (0.490)           (0.704)    
CIT_PAT      -0.618            -0.142    
     (0.615)           (0.934)    
CIT_per_PUB  0.274        2.889**       
  (0.757)       (1.140)         
CIT_per_PAT  -1.175        -1.576         
  (0.658)       (1.284)         
NO_PUB_DUM  1.228     0.710      3.291        4.998    
  (2.192)   (2.374)     (3.123)      (3.397)    
NO_PAT_DUM  -5.271***    -5.054**    -0.426        1.954    
  (1.674)   (2.130)     (3.169)      (3.342)    
GENDER    0.405     0.469      2.144     2.539    
  (2.029)   (2.063)     (4.875)   (4.811)    
Joint sig. inst. dum. χ2(2) 23.76***    22.72***    25.47***    24.57***   
Joint  sig. field dum. χ2 (6)  32.54***    32.75***    29.92***    30.08***   
Joint  sig. Länder dum. χ2 (15)  107.40***    102.66***    49.05**    52.03***   
Log-Likelihood -1,853.23    -1,854.14    -2,400.21    -2,399.60   
# censored obs.  260    260    147    147   
Notes: All models include a constant, institution type and field dummies. The heteroscedasticity term includes six field dummies,  





6  CONCLUSIONS 
Given the increasing share of competitive grants - from public as well as private sector 
sources - supplementing universities core funding, the objective of this paper was to provide 
an analysis in the role of direction of faculty research in terms of basic versus applied research 
for attracting such grants. Although, we see that applied research indeed increases the share of 
industry funding of the research units’ total budgets as well as the amount, the 
complementarity between basic and applied research for success in raising industry grants 
suggests that researchers who provide basic scientific input as well as competencies on the 
applicability of such are most attractive targets for funding from the business sector. Thus, 
firms appear to seek access to basic science that is not feasible or not profitable to built-up in-
house, but also rely on the scientists’ ability to translate it into applicable technology. This 
points to a trade-off faced by the sponsoring firm between the advantage of sourcing basic 
science from universities and the costs of building absorptive capacities in-house to 
effectively use this knowledge. Collaborating with university research labs that are able to 
conduct both basic as well as applied research may reduce these costs, and hence, alleviate the 
trade-off.     
With respect to public grants the results suggest that public funding-authorities prize 
specialization. Research units with either a strong focus on either basic or on applied research 
raise significantly more grants than others. This is in line with previous findings. Application-
oriented research, for instance, has been shown to benefit from supra-national funding 
programs such as the EU-wide “Framework Programme for Research and Development”. In 
Germany also so-called “direct project funding” by the Federal Government has been to an 
increasing extent directed at promoting industry-science consortia that aim at research that is 
are more likely to be applied in nature. Grant programs by the German Research Foundation 
(DFG), on the other hand, may support rather basic research agendas as they attract applicants 
with particular high scientific excellence if measured in publications and citations (Grimpe 
2010). Moreover, the result that private sector and public grants are subject to different 
criteria with respect to research orientation suggests that industry grants offer a additional 
source of competitive funding for research units that may not be willing or not be able to raise 
other types of grants.  
However, the results ought to be interpreted with the study’s limitations in mind. Given the 
available data it was not possible to account for the dynamics between ex-ante research 
orientation that shapes the attractiveness for receiving industry funding and the incentives to  
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adopt a certain orientation to become more attractive for funding and the effects of funding on 
future research orientation. Panel data on a set of professors and their research unit would be 
desirable for such an exercise. Thus, it is important to stress that this study identified 
multivariate correlations and not necessarily a causal link. Further analysis would, moreover, 
not only benefit from distinguishing between types of public grants, but also from studying 
the providers of industry grants in greater detail. As results for the U.S by Cohen et al. (2002) 
suggest, it is very likely that the observed effects differ substantially between industries, firms 
of different sizes and different stages of maturity. Further research should also take into 
account the impact of ‘outside-factors’ such as government-subsidized cost sharing in public-
private partnerships and their effects of industry-funded university research that may also 
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APPENDIX  
Table A.1: Cross-Correlations Matrix between Main Variables 
 
 
Note: * significant at 1% level 
 
Table A.2: Grants, Research Orientation, and Research Performance by Research Fields and Institution Type (means) 
Field  # obs  GOVSHARE  GOVFUND  INDSHARE  INDFUND PUB  PUBCITS  PAT  PATCITS 




16.46  60.51  5.95 39.09  3.97 44.48  0.21 0.84 
Chemistry 95  22.10 82.22  6.06  68.05  27.52  513.24  1.80  23.24 
Biology 57  24.43 77.03  7.59  29.10  3.05  324.81  0.93  7.73 
Electrical Engineering  101  14.76 108.83  11.53  130.76  11.58 53.88  2.27  33.74 
Mechanical Engineering  108  21.68 174.52  14.00  205.35  3.93 27.06  1.84  40.39 
Other Engineering  100  22.00 155.84  10.05  123.51  6.73 88.38  1.57  12.59 
Universities 371 26.25 129.02 7.51 80.06 16.37 348.46 1.55 16.56 
Technical Universities  156  25.09  190.47  10.62 167.84  6.49 128.96  1.27 35.83 
Polytechnics 142  6.11  11.53  9.29 61.74  2.28 22.82  1.20  12.77 
 
123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6
1 INDSHARE 1       
2 INDFUND 0.532*  1     
3  GOVSHARE -0.082   0.034   1  
4  GOVFUND 0.083   0.439*   0.572* 1  
5  BASIC -0.303* -0.163*   0.303* 0.018 1  
6  APPLIED 0.303*   0.163*  -0.303* -0.018 -1.000* 1  
7  PUB  -0.119*  -0.056    0.182* 0.067 0.369* -0.369* 1  
8  PAT  0.103*   0.158*   0.045 0.146* -0.058 0.058 0.034 1  
9  PUBCITS -0.123*  -0.063    0.196* 0.062  0.349* -0.349* 0.802* 0.011 1 
10  PATCITS 0.098   0.289*  -0.022 0.084  -0.023 0.023 0.003 0.502*  0.004  1
11 UNI_SIZE -0.046   0.035    0.274* 0.192* 0.428* -0.428* 0.187* -0.043   0.178* 0.004 1
12 TOT_STAFF 0.037   0.487*   0.151* 0.499* 0.022 -0.022 0.102* 0.099   0.068  0.136* 0.127* 1
13 SCI_STAFF -0.186* -0.200*   0.192* -0.012  0.247* -0.247* 0.122* -0.039   0.135* -0.073  0.123* -0.188* 1
14  EXPER 0.009   0.004    0.150* 0.054  0.197* -0.197* 0.080 -0.020  0.015  -0.073  0.186* 0.054  -0.002 1
15  TTO  0.147*   0.119*   0.002 0.131* -0.297* 0.297* -0.107* 0.125* -0.065 0.074 -0.152* 0.115* -0.155* 0.020 1
16  GENDER -0.030 -0.055    -0.014 -0.060 -0.031 0.031 -0.029 -0.015 -0.027 -0.011 -0.004 -0.069 -0.001 -0.055 0.036 1 